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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. J. MEAGHER, JR., MARY ALICE 
ARENTZ, KATHERINE C. IVERS, 
l\tiARGARET FRANCES PRICE, N. J. 
MEAGHER .and KATHERINE T. 
MEAGHER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
(A. ppellants and Respondents) 
-vs.-
WEBER OIL COMPANY, JOE T. Case No. 8483 
JUHAN and PAUL STOCK, . 
Defendants 
(A. ppellants and Respondents) 
and 
EQUITY OIL COMPANY and ALL 
UNKNOWN PERSONS who claim any 
interest in the subject matter of this 
action, Defendants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
PAUL STOCK AND JOE T. JUHAN 
PRELI1fiNARY STATEMENT 
This analysis of plaintiffs' brief, by appellants and 
respondents Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan, is made 
necessary by the form and character of plaintiffs' brief. 
We think it appropriate to point out and discuss in 
detail many inaccurate, loose and erroneous statements 
an::l cone lusions found therein. 
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Such misstatements and erroneous conclusions 
appear on pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35 and 36 of plain-
tiffs' brief. 
Preliminarily, however, let it be noted that the 
names of the plaintiffs are not given in the title of their 
brief. This is important as will presently appear. Neither 
are the names of the defendants stated. This also is 
important because the defendants changed. 
A true enumeration of .all of the parties IS con-
tained in the title hereof. 
Plaintiffs' brief has 37 pages. The appendices have 
83 pages. This seems to be an abuse of the rules. 
Only appendices D, E, F and G to plaintiffs' brief 
have any relevancy to the issues here. References herein 
to appendices are to plaintiffs brief. 
There are 6 plaintiffs; only 4: are included in the 
Dece1nber 13, 1955 interlocutory judg1nent and decree. 
At page 2 of plaintiffs' brief the author asserts that 
"since October of 1944, plaintiffs have owned an un-
divided half of the \Yorking interest, as to oil, in the 
so-called 'Sheridan Lease.' " Now it is in1portant to kno'v 
who the plaintiffs are. Does the author 1nean all 6 of 
the plaintiffs, or 4 of the plaintiffs, or :2 of the plain-
tiffs' Why does he require us to speculate on 'vhat 
he means~ 1T nder our theory none of the plainti~fs has 
ever owned any rights to the working interest of the 
Sheridan Lease. 
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October of 1944 is the date of the Stock p,aper. To 
claim ownership through that paper is a colossal fraud. 
On this point this Court spoke only after mandate and 
in the light of an inadequate record. 
On January 27, 1948 (Ex. A-22) before the dis-
covery of oil, Meagher Sr. quitclaimed the property to 
the other plaintiffs. This deed did not convey the .after 
aequired oil rights (see vVeber's brief p. 25 et seq.). 
On May 10, 1954, after the discovery of oil, the 
Senior Meaghers again quitclaimed the property to their 
children. This was to confirm the first deed (Plain-
tiffs brief page 7). This is the deed that passed the 
title to Meaghers' children, if any titled p.assed. 
On April16, 1955, the Senior Meaghers still claimed 
a personal right to an accounting as if they still o\vned 
the property (Rep. Tr. 56). So the statement above 
quoted from plaintiffs' brief is untrue. The plaintiffs 
since October 1944 have not owned a one-half interest 
in the "Sheridan Lease." And the second trial based 
on the first quitclaim deed was a fraud on that court. 
Again at page 2 (Plaintiffs' brief) it is asserted 
"Thus this suit for an accounting was forced upon plain-
tiffs." That statement is untrue. This suit is more th.an 
a suit for an accounting. 
In bringing this suit to recover the whole 40.75% 
plaintiffs characteristically seek to circumvent the first 
mandate and the affirmed Dunford Decree. This the 
lower court in this action refused to let plaintiffs do. 
See "Rulings on ~1otions" dated October 14, 1955 (R. 
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213-215). Those rulings were made in conformity with 
our rules and that judgment possesses .all of the form-
ality and dignity that a summary judgment can possess. 
There the lower court granted. judgment to defend~nts 
on the first and third counts of the complaint; and to 
the plaintiffs for an accounting on the second count 
of the complaint. The fourth count of the complaint 
had long since been dismissed out of the .action (R. 113-
114). Plaintiffs made no attempt to amend or appeal. 
This disposes of pages 27 to 32 of plaintiffs' brief. All 
authorities cited by plaintiffs, except 3, go to the lower 
court's dismissal of their 4th count. That occurred on 
December 21, 1954. 
Again at page 2 (Plaintiffs' brief) plaintiffs say 
that their rights were so obvious that they were declared 
by summary proceedings in this case. On the contrary, 
to the lower court it 'vas obvious that if the Dunford 
Decree was to be given v.reight, Stock and Juhan jointly 
were entitled to one-half of the 40.75~- held by Equity 
as stakeholder. That is ,,~hy the lo,Yer court signed 
and filed the Dece1nber 13, 1955 order requiring Equity 
to pay over to these appellants that an1ount. The order 
was in strict harn1ony 'vith the Dunford Decree and 
with the lo,ver court's Rulings on )lotions (R. 213-215). 
ANALYSIS OF PL.AINTIFFS' 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
At page 3 of their brief, plaintiffs discuss "the 
litigation'' rather than this litigation. They represent 
that these appeals bring this controversy to this Court 
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for the fourth time. The assertion is untrue-and, more-
over, if it be true, these proceedings should be sunl-
marily dismissed. 
At page 4 (Plaintiffs' brief), plaintiffs again put 
1n issue this Court's mandate in No. 6972 (185 P.2d 
7-1:7). Plaintiffs state "This Court ... remanded the 
case for further proceedings which, of course, required 
determination of the ownership of interests in the lease." 
That is a co1npletely untrue statement. Now is the time 
to set the record straight and end the repeated inten-
tional falsification of the record. 
THE MANDATE (FIRST APPEAL) 
The mandate in the first appeal (No. 6972) did 
not remand the case for "further proceedings_. which, of 
course, required determination of the ownership of 
interests in the lease." That statement stems from dis-
honesty and deceit. It is calculated misstatement. 
The mandate is: 
"The decision of the lower court is reversed, 
and the case remanded to that Court for pro-
ceedings to conform to this opinion." (Emphasis 
added). 
In scores of instances the author of plain-
tiffs' pleadings and brief has thus intentionally falsified 
the mandate. The author of plaintiffs' brief persistently 
inserts the word "further" in the mandate and deletes the 
words "to conform to this opinion" from the mandate. 
He thus emasculates the mandate. This is not inad-
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vertent. It is consciously done. Why does he resort to 
this trick~ We do not ch.arge the plaintiffs nor ~1r. 
Van Da1n with such conduct. The author's conduct in 
this regard, so often resorted to, here and in the lower 
court, is a fraud meant to mislead this Court on an · 
important issue. 
The author of t~eir brief at page 4 says: 
"Next, the case reached this Court 1n a 
mandamus proceeding." 
This case reached the Supreme Court only in this 
proceeding. Counsel adroitly says "'the case". Now he 
can argue he meant that case, or this case whichever 
suits his purpose best. Throughout their brief this 
chameleon characteristic persists. 
Again on page 5 of plaintiffs' brief he raises the 
mandate issue. The author says: 
"The third occasion for this Court to act 
involved an appeal fron1 the decision of the lo·wer 
court after the second trial be!o·zc. ·In tl1at second 
trial, the lo,ver court exa1nined all clailns of the 
parties to interests in the Sheridan Lease ... " 
(Emphasis added). 
The only jurisdiction, the only po,ver, the lo,Yer 
court possessed after the 1nandate in that case 'vas 
revested in it by the re1nittitur. That is the function of 
a remittitur. Its jurisdiction "~as li1nited to carrying out 
the 1nandate. 
'Vhere did the lower court obtain jurisdiction to 
gr.ant a new trial '1 Or to per1nit amend1nents to plead-
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ings v? Or to bring in new parties~ And if a new trial 
was properly had, why this trial~ 
And further, in the appeal from the second trial 
the povver of this Court was limited to determine if 
the lower court had complied with the mandate. If it 
had, the appeal should have been dismissed. If it had 
not, this Court should have sent the c.ase back with 
appropriate instructions. The fact that this Court enter-
tained the appeal from the second trial is proof enough 
that the mandate had not been complied with. See 
K rant.z v. Rio Grande TV estern Ry. Co., 13 Utah 1, 43 
P. 623, and Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 lTtah 320, 
81 P.2d 359 at page 363, and other Utah cases. 
If the mandate was not complied with these appel-
lants are entitled to a trial on the merits of the issues 
formed by the pleadings. 
If the mandate w.as complied with these appellants 
are entitled to the fruits of the Dunford Decree, i.e. 
¥2 of the 40.75%. 
At the top of page 6 of their brief plaintiffs say 
this suit was cornmenced " ... to declare plaintiffs' 
rights as against Equity Oil Company and vVeber Oil 
Co1npany, and to obta-in an accounting and puyment 
from all defendants." Plaintiffs' proposed interlocutory 
judgment and decree does not do that. Plaintiffs led 
the lower court into error and now seek to have that 
decree changed, corrected or reversed. One cannot induce 
a court to commit error and then take .advantage of 
that error. 
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THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
(Plaintiffs' brief p. 6) 
At pages 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of their brief the 
author re-states past events commencing with October 
21, 194+. This is past history. This is not a "statement 
of the case'' as provided by the rules. It is no aid to 
this eourt. To support his theory, he cites Civil No. 
2238 in the second trial (after mandate) eight times. 
Plain tiffs clai1n two final decrees. They now seek an-
other. It is difficult for one to understand why plain-
tiffs did not, in the first place, try all the issues against 
all of the parties defendant in favor of all of the parties 
plaintiff. Son1eti1ne plaintiffs' right to further litigate 
will be exausted. ~faybe that time has already arrived. 
At page 11 of their brief the author sa:Ts that the 
District Court granted the interlocutory summary judg-
Jnent. It could grant only one sueh judgment. That is 
the judgment of October 1-l-, 1955 (R. 213-215). Under 
rule 56 (d) this judgn1ent is not appealable. The appeal 
from the interlocutory judgn1ent and decree of Decenl-
ber 13, 1955, is abortive because that decree is n1ere 
surplusage. Plaintiffs' appeal should be disn1issed. 
The lo,ver court in this case did not find or decree 
in its October 1±, 1955 Rulings that the title clain1ed 
by the plaintiffs is valid against Equity and Weber. 
It decided just the opposite (R. 213-215). 
The .author at page 12 of plaintiffs' brief puts the 
word "mistakenly" in the Judge ~s n1outh. In his order 
of December 15, 1955, the Judge gave two reasons for 
his order. Neither is based on "mistake'' (R. 2-l-6). The 
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orders of Decen1ber 13, 1955 and December 15, 1955 
will be hereinafter discussed. 
Again on page 14 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author 
refers to the December 15, 1955 order, as "expressly" 
stating that the December 13, 1955 order was "entered by 
n1istake" and is vacated as being in conflict with 
the "Interlocutory Judgment and Decree". The word 
"mistake" is not in the December 15, 1955 order. And th~ 
December 13, 1955 order could not be in conflict with 
the interlocutory judgment and decree of the same date 
for the simple reason that that decree is a nullity-being 
mere surplusage. 
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT 
(Plaintiffs' brief p. 15) 
The author of plaintiffs' brief persistently refuses 
to correctly state the record. He adds to, subtracts from, 
and otherwise consciously perverts what Mr. Van Dam 
says (R. 249-251) and \Vhat the trial judge s.aid. We 
pass the improprieties involved. 
Commencing with page 14 of plaintiffs' brief, the 
author thereof records what the judge told Mr. v:ran 
Dam and what l\fr. \Tan Dam told the judge. Co1npare 
that with Nir. Van Dam's .affidavit, Appendix G 1 - G 4. 
Mr. Wheat's Statements. 
Mr. Wheat: 
"The judge stated that Mr. 
Musser had presented an 
order on behalf of Stock and 
Juhan" (Plaintiffs' brief 17). 
Mr. Van Dam's Statements. 
Mr. Van Dam: 
"Then Judge Tuckett said that 
Mr. Musser had presented an 
order to him in behalf of de-
fendants Stock and Juhan, 
and asked me if we objected 
to it" (Mr. Van Dam did 
not). (App. G-1). 
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Mr. vVheat deleted "and asked me if we objected to 
it" and the fact that Mr. Van Dam did not object to it. 
Mr. Wheat: 
"Mr. Van Dam asked the 
Judge if the order affected 
the interests of plaintiffs 
under the interlocutory j udg-
ment and decree, and the 
Judge said that it did not" 
(Plaintiffs' brief 17). 
Mr. Van Dam: 
"I asked him (Judge Tuckett) 
whether the order would have 
any effect upon the rights 
of plaintiffs under the Inter-
locutory Judgment and De-
cree. He said it was his 
understanding that it VJould 
not." (App. G-1, G-2). 
1Ir. Wheat deleted the italicized words. 
lVIr. Wheat: 
"Mr Van Dam then pointed 
out to the Judge that such 
an order would concern the 
plaintiffs because the im-
pounded funds do not include 
<:tll of the oil proceeds but 
1:mpound only the plaintiffs' 
half" (Plaintiffs' brief 17). 
Mr. Van Dam: 
"I then told him it seemed to 
me that the order was in con-
flict with the Interlocutory 
Judgment and Decree, and had 
the effect of distributing 
part of the impounded funds 
both to plaintiffs and to de-
fendants Stock and Juhan at 
the same time.~' (App. G-2). 
nir. vVhe.at puts the italicized \Yords in the mouth 
of l\fr. \ 7 an Da1n. This is inexcusable. 
l\1r. Wheat: 
"The Judge said he had no 
intention of awarding the de-
fendants anything to which 
the plaintiffs are entitled 
under the Interlocutory Judg-
ment and Decree." (Plaintiffs' 
brief 17). 
l\lr. Van Dam: 
"Judge Tuckett said he did 
not intend to do any such 
thing. and stated that he 
would withhold the order 
(which had already been filed 
and entered R. 263) and take 
it back with him to Provo. 
(App. G-2). 
Mr. 'Vhe.at adds and deletes the italicized \Yords 
fron1 .and to \vhat Mr. \Tan Dan1 said. (The Dece1nber 
13, 1955 order does not award anything to these appel-
lants that plaintiffs are entitled to.) 
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"He also said he would with-
hold the order***. The judge 
instructed Mr. Van Dam to ad-
vise counsel with respect to 
the situation, and Mr. Van 
Dam did so" (Plaintiffs' brief 
17). 
11 
Mr. Van Dam: 
"He requested me . . . to 
notify Mr. Musser of his in-
tentions with respect to the 
order." (Mr. Van Dam tried 
to contact Mr. Musser but was 
unable to.) (App. G-2). 
~.fr. Wheat adds the italicized words "and he did 
so." 
On page 18 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author states: 
"The vacating order of December 15th confirms the 
foregoing ... " It does no such thing. It does assign as 
the ground for trying to revoke the order of December 
13th the .assertion that said order conflicts with the 
decree of the same date. That ground is wholly insuffici-
ent because the decree of December 13th is a nullity. 
RULINGS ON 1\10TIONS 
On page 18 of plaintiffs' brief, the last line, the 
author characterizes the "Rulings on Motions" as a 
memorandunt decision and states: "By memorand1~m de-
cision entitled "Rulings on Motions," dated October 14, 
1955, ... '' 
This statement of the .author of plaintiffs' brief is 
deliberately, palpably and, again, inexcusably false. The 
"Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955, are so iinpor-
tant in these proceedings that these appellants set por-
tions of it out herein. 
The trial judge's "Rulings on Motion" is not a 
memorandurn decision of the District Judge. It is a 
formal summary judgment made and entered "By the 
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Court'' under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and possesses all of the formality and dignity that any 
such judgment can possess. It is the judgment pursuant 
to the motions for summary judgment. With the great-
est fidelity the trial judge adhered to our rules relating 
to summary judgment. On the other hand the inter-
locutory judgment and decree of December 13, 1955, is 
surplusage. The trial judge unfortunately was led into 
error by the telephone conversations (R. 255-257 and 
264). 
These appellants specifically call tllis Court's atten-
tion to the affidavit of ~Ir. \Tan Dam (R. 255-257), Ap-
pendix G to plaintiffs' brief, and to :Jir. ~fusser's affi-
davit (R. 266). These affidavits sho"~ .an amazing course 
of conduct involving grave improprieties. 
"RlTLINGS OX :JIOTIOXS 
( R. :213-215) 
N 0. 3228 CiYil 
In this matter the Plaintiffs, as well as the 
Defendants Joe T. Juhan, P.aul Stock, and the 
Equity Oil Company, a Corporation, have filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
• • • 
The Equity Oil Company appears only as a 
stakeholder. It has, pursuant to agreement with 
the Plaintiffs, maintained .a special account of 
an amount equal to at least 40.75 per cent of the 
gross crude oil runs after expenses of operations. 
The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Summary 
Judgment against the Equity Oil Company, on 
the second count of Plaintiffs' complaint; for .an 
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accounting of the operations and profits of the 
oil produced by said Defendant on the lands in 
question; and to a judgment against said Defend-
ants Equity Oil Company for an amount equal to 
one-half the proceeds after operating expenses . 
are deducted. (Emphasis added.) 
In the first count of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
the Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to their interest 
under the Sheridan lease. These issues were tried 
and determined in the prior case and the plain-
tiffs cannot retry the same issues. The Defend-
ants' Motions for Summary Judgment are gr.anted 
as to the first and third counts of the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 14th day of October, 
1955. 
BY THE COURT: 
R. L. Tuckett" 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
On Page 19 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author says: 
"Defendants Stock and Juhan proposed no 
form of decree, but did file objections to the form 
submitted by plaintiffs ... " (First italics theirs, 
second ours). 
There is not an iota of truth in the above state-
ment. The objections to plaintiffs' propo_sed interlocu-
tory judgment and decree contain 4 pages (R. 230-234) 
and adopts Weber's objections (R. 235). 
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The first paragraph of the objections is: 
"Defendants Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan 
object to plaintiffs' proposed 'Interlocutory Judg-
ment and Decree' filed herein and the whole 
thereof for the reasons and because of the objec-
tions herein contained, and the objections filed 
herein by Weber Oil Contpany." (R. 230). (Em-
phasis added.) 
Included in appellants' objections is the following: 
"Under the Dunford decree, as affirmed, 
these individual defendants have jointly a full 
one-fourth interest as to oil in the Sheridan 
Lease, which interest was carved out of the Stock 
one-half interest and 'vhich was 'the principal 
subject of litigation' in Case No. 2238, after 
mandate. 
If the decree in No. 2238 is a final judg-
Inent upon which plaintiffs can and do rely, 
they cannot be heard to urge the entry of their 
proposed judgment decreeing to them the prop-
erty the former judgn1ent decreed to these de-
fendants. That conclusion is unassailable. In 
moving this Court to grant their motion for sum-
mary judgment against these defendants, plain-
tiffs attack the former judgment of this Court 
and seek to have it declared to be a nullity. 
That conclusion is unassailable. 
• • • 
If the judgment in 2238, after mandate, is 
a final adjudication as claimed by plaintiffs, their 
motion for sun1mary judgment herein must be 
denied. 
If the judgment in 2238 is not a final adjudi-
cation as it is now treated by plaintiffs herein, 
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15 
their motion for summary judgment cannot be 
granted. A trial of all the issues joined is the 
alternative. 
:111 • • 
The Court herein has ruled that all parties-
plaintiffs and defendants, except Weber, are 
bound by the former decree. To proffer plain-
tiffs' proposed Interlocutory Judgment and De-
cree contradicts plaintiffs' complaint, holds for 
naught the Dunford decree, disregards the 
Supreme Court's affirmation of the Dunford de-
cree, is contrary to plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, ignores the rulings of this Court here-
in and is a brazen attempt to lead this Court into 
grev1ous error. 
:i * • 
DATED this lOth day of November, 1955." 
(R. 232, 233, 234). 
These objections go to the merits of plaintiffs' pro-
posed interlocutory judgment and decree. They cannot 
be tortured into a mere objection to form. The author's 
misstatement of the record is not inadvertent. It is 
much graver than that. It goes to professional honesty. 
We sincerely believe these deceptions will not profit him. 
THE SUB~IISSIONS WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' brief, page 20, contains 1\tir. Wheat's 
letter submitting the matters to Judge Tuckett without 
oral argUment. In their letter they misstate the letters 
of Weber and of Stock and Juhan and pervert these 
letters into a submission of the "form" of interlocutory 
judgment and decree without oral argument. These 
letters are as follows: (Mr. Gustin's letter and Mr. Mus-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
ser's letter are not in the record. They are referred to 
by Mr. Wheat. If desirable we will ask for a diminution 
of the record to include them.) 
Honorable R. L. Tuckett 
Judge, District Court 
City and County Building 
Provo, Utah 
Sir: 
"November 19, 1955 
Re: Meagher et al v. Equity Oil Company et 
al. Uintah County, Civil No. 3228 
We intended our letter to you of November 
10, 1955, re above subject, with which we trans-
mitted to you our 'Objections and Motion', to be 
a submission on our part of said objections and 
motion without further argument. That letter 
and the referred to objections and motion now do 
not seem quite clear with respect to said submis-
sion. We do respectfully submit for your decision 
said objections and motion without further argu-
ment. 
We desire to be heard only in the event other 
parties are heard and you desire to hear orally 
from us. 
Respectfully, 
cc: Mr. Harley W. Gustin 
Mr. Gilbert C. Wheat 
Mr. Herbert "'\Tan Dam 
Mr. Richard Downing 
Burton W. Musser 
Mr. Oliver W. Steadman'' 
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"GlTSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys-at-Law 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Honorable R. L. Tuckett 
Judge, District Court 
City and County Building 
Provo, Utah 
Dear Judge Tuckett : 
November 21, 1955 
Re: Meagher et al. v. Equity Oil Company 
et .al. (Uintah County Civil Case 
3228) 
We have a copy of Mr. Musser's letter di-
rected to you under date of November 19th. On 
behalf of Weber Oil Company and Equity Oil 
Company we subscribe to the same course of 
procedure suggested by Mr. Musser, provided, of 
course, the plaintiffs are not heard orally. 
If the matters are to be submitted without 
further oral argument, we call attention to an 
error in our proposed form of judgment which 
w.as handed to you on October 22nd last. On the 
second page in the third line of paragraph num-
bered 1 the date 'January 4, 1924' should be 
'June 4, 1924.' 
Respectfully yours, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
By Harley W. Gustin 
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cc: Mr. Gilbert C. Wheat 
Mr. Herbert Van Dam 
Mr. Richard Downing 
Mr. Oliver W. Steadman 
Mr. Burton W. 1\Iusser" 
LILLICK, GEARY, OLSON, ADA~IS 
& CHARLES 
Attorneys at Law 
San Francisco 4, California 
November 21, 1955 
Honorable R. L. Tuckett 
Judge of the District Court 
Provo 
Meagher, et al v. 
Equity Oil Company, et al 
No. 3228-Civil 
Dear Judge Tuckett : 
Mr. 'ran Da1n has advised me that Mr. 
Gustin, in behalf of defendants Equity Oil Com-
pany and ''r eber Oil Company~ and Mr. Musser, 
in behalf of defendants Paul Stock and Joe T. 
Juhan, have suggested that the settlement of the 
form of Interloeutory Judgn1ent and Decree be 
submitted "'"ithout oral argument. 
If you consider that the matter has been 
adequately presented in the rarious proposals 
for decree and ob.fections u. ... lz,ich a're before yo1l 
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now, we are agreeable to having the matter stand 
as submitted. (Emphasis added). 
5:9:12337 
Yours very truly, 
Gilbert C. Wheat 
cc. Messrs. Gustin 
Musser 
Steadman 
Downing 
This letter is not an objection to our motion for 
one-half of the 40.75% nor an objection to its submission 
to the court. 
The author's misinterpretation of these letters is 
one more attempt to mislead this Court. Plaintiffs sub-
mitted everything that was before the court. The .author 
is haggling over the plain meaning of vvords. His claim 
that there 'vas no submission does not excuse him for 
failing to object to the motion. Finally he must admit 
that there \vas no objection and could be no objection 
to the motion which culminated in the December 13, 
1955 order in f.avor of Stock and Juhan. If Mr. Wheat 
did not submit Mr. Musser's motion by the same token 
_jir. :r.Jusser did not submit Mr. Wheat's decree. It is 
nonsense. 
At page 21 of their brief plaintiffs suggest that the 
December 15, 1955 order may be voidable and then ask 
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"· · . this Court to clarify the record either by reversing 
the inadvertent order of December 13th, or by affirming 
the (voidable) order of December 15th, ... " 
"Any port in a storm." 
On pages 21 and 22 of plaintiffs' brief, plaintiffs 
seek an amendment of the interlocutory judgment and 
decree proposed by them, and which was not changed 
by the judge (App. G-1). Mr. Van Dam says: "I asked 
him if he had made any change in it, and he said he 
had made none." (App. G-1, G-4). The judge signed the 
interlocutory judgment and decree in the exact form 
and language of plaintiffs. It does not now lie in their 
mouths to ask this Court to cure an error deliberately 
in vi ted and insisted on by plaintiffs. 
On p.ages 22 and 23 of plaintiffs' brief under the 
heading "3" plaintiffs say: "Possibly this Court will 
deem this issue to be beyond the scope of this appeal." 
(This is an understaten1ent.) "If so, plaintiffs request 
a clear declaration to that effect to avoid further contro-
versy.'' That is to say, this Court "\Yithout pleadings, 
without he.aring and "\Yithout facts should 1nake a '"clear 
declaration" to carry out an ohYious falsehood. 
Pages 22 to 27 (Plaintiffs~ brief) consist of irrele-
vant incoherencie~. ''; e belieYe this Court "\vill ignore 
the1n. Pages '27 to 32 (Plaintiffs' brief) are effec.tiYely 
dealt "\vith in \\T eber Oil Con1pany1s brief page ~7. 'r e 
adopt that. 
All parties seek .a dis1nissal or reyersal of these 
appeals ~o far a~ they relate to the Dece1nber 13, 1955 
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interlocutory juC!g1nent and decree. 
These appellants seek the revocation of the Decem-
ber 15, 1955 order. 
Plaintiffs request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief, 
p. 36, para. 3) that this Court, on this .appeal, adjudi-
cate that Equity, Weber and these appellants, Stock 
and Juhan, are jointly and severally bound by the inter-
locutory judgment and decree, or, in the alternative, 
declare that the interlocutory judgment and decree does 
not diminish the obligations of vVeber, Stock and Juhan 
as the same may be determined in further proceedings 
below. 
Plaintiffs also request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief, 
p. 36, para. 4) that Equity is responsible to plaintiffs 
jointly and severally with defendants Weber, Stock and 
Juhan, and to the same extent defendants \Veber, Stock 
.and Juhan, are so obliged (sic) . 
Plaintiffs also request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief, 
p. 36, para. 6) that this Court, on this appeal, direct 
the lower court to conduct further proceedings not 
expressly or specifically determined by the interlocutory 
judgment and decree. As this decree is void, what IS 
this Court going to direct the lower court to do~ 
Each of these requests is inconsistent with reason 
and common sense and therefore each is absurd. So far 
as plaintiffs' appeal is concerned this is another abortive 
and time consuming procedure. 
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Weber Oil Company has 1n accordance with the 
rules and in a highly factual and lawyer-like manner 
1nade a "Statement of The Case." We respectfully ask 
leave to, and we do, adopt its statement of the case. 
The author of plaintiffs' brief refuses to abide by 
the laws and rules of this State relating to summarv 
judgments1 ; he refuses to be bound by the mandates 
of this Court2 ; he refuses to conform to our la-\YS relating ' 
to appeals3 ; he refuses to prepare his brief in con-
formance to our rules4 ; he misstates and falsifies the 
record5 ; he will not abide by rulings of the Court6 ; he 
piteously cries for "American Justice"': Plaintiffs' brief 
is a fraud. It is filled 'Yith deceit, trickery and sharp 
practices by \vhich the author seeks to gain an unfair 
and dishonest advantage. 
1 See Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 The mandates in the first and second appeals have not been com-
plied with. 
3 Only final jud1nents can be appealed from. 
4 As to size and contents of briefs. 
G There was a submission by all parties of all pending matters to the 
lower court; these appell-ants objected to the plaintiffs' proffered 
interlocutory judgment and decree as a whole and not n1erely 
as to form; the lower court's "Rulings on !Motions" is not a mere 
memorandum descision; the author puts \Vords in the mouths of 
his associate and of the trial judge etc., etc. Plaintiffs' "The 
factual background" is saturated with over statements, misstate-
ments, additions and deletions. 
6 Judge ·Tuckett's "Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955, is the 
l·aw of this case up to this point and until the issues below are 
tried. ·Plaintiffs' interlocutory judgment and decree is a phoney 
and a nullity. 
7 Plain tiffs' brief pages 36 to 37. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The December 15, 1955 order, seeking to revoke 
the December 13, 1955 order, should be vacated 
because: 
(a) The lovver court \Vas without power to re-
voke its formal order on the grounds stated, 
and 
(b) These appellants were entitled to notice an_d.-. 
~· 
a hearing on the December 15, 1955 order._. 
2. The so-called interlocutory judgment and decree 
of December 13, 1955, as proposed by plaintiffs, 
is surplusage. It isn't a final appealable judg-
ment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Tl-!E DECEMBER 15, 1955 ORDER SHOULD 
BE REVOKED. 
This order is dated at Provo, Utah, December 15, 
1955, and was filed at Vernal, Utah, December 17, 1955 
(R. 246). It \vas signed without notice to these appel-
lants and vvithout a hearing. 
There are two grounds of revocation expressed in 
the order : ( 1) There is no issue of law or of fact pre-
sented by the pleadings on file upon which said order 
could be based; and (2) That said order is in conflict 
vvith the interlocutory judgment and decree entered in 
said cause on the 13th day of December, 1955. 
( 1) It isn't clear what the trial judge means by his 
first ground. These appellants had a judgement. That 
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ju·dgment had been affirmed by this Court (255 P. 2d 
989). As affairmed the judgment had been invoked 
against these appellants. Unless everything after the 
mandate is a nullity, these appellants' judgment was 
enforce.able. Equity Oil Company was holding the money 
until the further order of the court (R. 123-125). The 
motion of Stock and Juhan sought a further order of the 
court (R. 234). The motion upon which the order was 
based was not objected to by any party. It had been 
confessed by all parties. It had been duly submitted for 
decision by all parties (This brief p. 16). By their lack 
of ·action or objection to the motion plaintiffs disclaim 
all interest in the ~2 of 40.75%, the subject matter of 
the motion. The motion was served on all parties and 
pended for 30 days. 
The trial judge's first ground is untenable. 
( 2) The second ground given by the trial judge is 
more obscure than the first. While the clerk's records 
show the entry of the December 13, 1955 order before 
the entry of the D·ecember 13th interlocutory judgment 
and decree, the probability is that they were signed 
simultaneously and deposited together vvith the clerk. 
Philosophically it cannot be determined \\~hich, if either, 
is in conflict with the other, except as 'vill nov~T be shown. 
Under our rules the Decemher 13, 1955 interlocutory 
judg1nent and decree is surplusage (Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure). There is no statute or rule giving 
the lower court jurisdiction or power to enter the so-
called December 13th interlocutory judgment ·and decree. 
rrhe lower court had made its rulings on motions for 
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summary judgment on October 14, 1955 (R. 213-215), 
and that court had no jurisdiction or power to enter 
any other interlocutory judgrnent and decree. 
Appellants' order of December 13, 1955, could not 
possibly be in conflict with the interlocutory judgment 
and decree of December 13, 1955, beeause that decree 
could not and did not legally exist. It is mere surplusage~ 
It is based on no statute or rule or practice, it was and 
is error. It does not and connot supplant, augment, take 
away from or change in the slightest particular the 
October 14, 1955 "Rulings on ~1otions" of the lower 
court. 
So the lower court was not in error on either of the 
grounds mentioned when it entered the December 13, 
1955 order in favor of these appellants. But if it had 
been it cannot use that error to recall, vacate or set aside 
an entered order previously made by it. 
Blankenship v. Royalty Iiolding Co. (C.C.A. lOth 
Cir.), 202 F. 2d 77. 
''Courts possess the inherent power to cor-
rect errors in the records evidencing the judg-
ment pronounced by the court so as to make them 
speak the truth by actually reflecting that which 
was in fact done. They do not, however, possess 
the power to correct an error by the court in 
rendering a judgment it did not intend to render 
and by such an order change a judgment actually 
but erroneously pronounced by the court to the 
one the court intended to record. With these 
principles all courts are in accord." 
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2. THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS BY ITS 
VERY NATURE INTERLOCUTORY AND 
NOT APPEALABLE. 
Paragraph 9 of that judgment and decree (R. 216-
224) reserves the question of fact to be determined by 
the trial court and paragraph 10 thereof decrees that the 
judgment and decree is interlocutory and reserves 
further questions for further action by the court. Pages 
12, 21 and 22 of plaintiff's brief emphasizes the point. 
At 'page 22 plaintiffs state: 
"Again, because of the interlocutory nature of 
the interlocutory Judgment and Decree, plaintiffs 
are at a disadvantage in analyzing its final effect 
upon their rights." 
Under our Constitution only final judgments are 
appealable. Free1nan on Jttdgntents, Vol. 1, Section 22, 
page 34~, defines a final judgment and quotes the follo\v-
Ing: 
" 'A decree is final for the purposes of an 
appeal to this court when it terminates the liti-
gation between the parties on the merits of the 
case, and leaves nothing to be done but to en-
force by execution \Yhat has been deter1nined.' " 
An interlocutory decree is defined by the san1e author 
in Section 38, page 63 : 
"An interlocutory decree is one made 'pend-
ing the cause, and before a final hearing on the 
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merits. A final decree is one which disposes of 
the cause, either by sending it out of the eourt 
before a hearing is had on the merits, or after a 
hearing on the merits, decreeing either in favor of 
or against the prayer of the bill.' But no order 
or decree which does not preclude further pro-
ceedings in the case in the court below should be 
considered final. " 
Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
for an appeal from final judgments. The appeal herein 
is taken frorn the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment and is pursuant to Rule 56 (d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Proced~tre. This rule provides that a summary 
judgment may be granted vvhere all of the issues are not 
determined and a trial is necessary. The fourth para-
graph of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
states: 
" ( 4) That further proceeding shall be taken 
in this proceeding to state said account and de-
termine all issues which remain undisposed of 
by said interlocutory su1nmary decrees;" (R. 
163). 
\Vhere an order of summary judgment is granted 
without disposing of all of the issues, such an order of 
summary judgment is not a judgment from which an 
appeal lies under Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
ced1tre, citing Big gin v. Otlmer I ron W arks ( C.C.A. 7th 
Cir.), 154 F. 2d 214. 
There is no appeal from the interlocutory judgment 
and decree of December 13, 1955, either by way of inter-
mediate appeal pursuant to Rule 72.(b) or an appeal 
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under Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
lower court's "Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955, 
supra, \vas 1nade pursuant to motions for summary judg-
lnent. Those rulings are in strict conformity \Vith our 
rules. No appeal lies therefrom. 
The importance of the situation is emphasized by 
the jurisdictional question involved and the possibility 
of further unnecessary litigation if this Court acts in a 
matter \Yhere jurisdiction is lacking . 
.L11 c Pwen v. 11! cE1cen, ________ Or ....... , 280 P. 2d 402: 
"It is from the foregoing decree that defend-
ants have appealed to this court. It is manifest 
that this is not a final decree. Winters v. Grimes, 
124 Or. 214, 264 P. 359. 
* * * 
Under the decree in the instant case, the par-
ties are directed to account. A further hearing 
and determination by the court upon such account-
ing is necessary. Until the accounting is had and 
finally settled by the court the decree cannot be-
come final. Robertson v. Henderson, 181 Or. 200, 
202, 179 P. 2d 74~; ~Iuellhaupt v. Joseph A. 
Strawbridge Estate Co., 136 Or. 99, 298 P. 186. 
Whether a right of appeal exists is a juris-
dictional question. lT nless an appeal is author-
ized by the statute, this court has no jurisdiction 
to consider it. Jurisdiction of the supreme court 
eannot be conferred by consent, agTeement or 
"'raiver of the parties litigant. Liimatainen Y. 
State Industrial Accident Commission, 118 Or. 
260, 277, 246 P. 7 -~1: Catlin v. Jones, 56 Or. 49~~ 
494, 1 OS P. 633. 
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When want of jurisdiction appears at any 
stage of the proceedings it is the duty of the 
court, on its own motion, to refuse to proceed 
further. Ehrstrom v. Baum, 159 Or. 299, 300, 79 
P. 2d 991; Spokane Merchants' Association v. 
Gollihur, 122 Or. 146, 257 P. 812; Dippold v. Cath-
lamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183, 193 P. 909; Rynear-
son v. Union County, 54 Or. 181, 184, 102 P. 785. 
In 2 Am. Jur. 860, Appeal and Error, Section 
22, it is stated 
'A judgment, order, or decree, to be final 
for purposes of an appeal or error, must dis-
pose of the cause, or a distinct branch thereof, 
as to all the parties, reserving no further ques-
tions or directions for future determination. It 
must finally dispose of the whole subject-matter 
or be a termination of the particular proceed-
ings or action, leaving nothing to be done but 
to enforce by execution what has been de-
termined. * * *' (Italics ours.) 
See also In re Norton's Estate, 175 Or. 115, 
151 P. 2d 719, 156 A.L.R. 617; Abrahamson v. 
Northwestern Pulp & Paper Co., 141 Or. 339, 15 
P. 2d 472, 17 P. 2d 1117; Watkins v. Mason, 11 
Or. 72, 4 P. 524. 
No motion was filed in this court to dismiss 
this appeal. However, it clearly appearing that 
the decree as a whole is interlocutory and not 
final, this court is without jurisdiction to review 
the proceeding. In such circumstances, it is the 
duty of the court to dismiss the appeal on its 
own motion.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
The litigation complained of by plaintiffs from 
1944 to date-and there must be more, suggests the 
desirability of bringing it to a close. This much desired 
end can be brought about, we believe, in only one way, 
that is, for this Court to enforce its judgment as reflected 
in its mandate in Case No. 6792 (185 P. 2d 747), and 
to hold that everything that occurred in Case No. 2238 
(before Judge Dunford) after mandate is a nullity. No'v 
the slate is clean. The parties can proceed from that 
starting point as they are advised. Without such a 
declaration by this Court the end of litigation is not 
in sight for at every step, even on execution, the parties 
affected may invoke their property rights to and under 
this Court's judgment. These rights are guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of this State, and 
by the Constitution of the United States. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
BURTON \Y .. !fUSSER 
RICHARD DOWNING 
OLI\TER W. STEAD!IAK 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
Respondent Paul Sto·ck and 
Joe T. JUft.an. 
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